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Abstract
In this paper the authors present an agent-based model of a credit network economy. The artificial
economy includes different economic agents that interact using simple behavioral rules through
various markets, i.e., the consumption goods market, the labor market, the credit market and the
housing market. A set of computational experiments, based on numerical simulations of the model,
have been carried out in order to explore the effects of different households’ creditworthiness
conditions required by the banking system to grant a mortgage. The authors find that easier access
to credit inflates housing prices, triggering a short run output expansion, mainly due to the wealth
effect. Also, with a more permissive policy towards household mortgages, and thus higher levels
of credit, the artificial economy becomes more unstable and prone to recessions usually caused
by falling housing prices. Often the authors find that an initial crisis can leave firms in a fragile
state. If the situation is not cured, a subsequent crisis can lead to mass bankruptcies of firms
with catastrophic effects on the credit sector and on the real economy. With stricter conditions on
household mortgages the economy is more stable and does not fall into serious recessions, although
a too severe regulation can slow down economic growth.
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1 Introduction
The most widely used modeling approach in macroeconomics is based on the
general equilibrium framework, and a class of models, known as dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) models (see e.g. Smets et al. (2002)), are the
workhorses in the field. The shortcomings of the general equilibrium framework
and its variations have been known for a long time (Kirman (1989)) and recently
have been subject to severe scrutiny due to lack of consideration of financial factors
and their inability to foresee the great recession1. Recently, it has been also em-
phasized that agent-based models can be used as an alternative tool for economic
modeling and policy making2, see e.g. Farmer and Foley (2009). Agent-based mod-
els have shown promise of being able to take into account the complex interactions
of different economic agents (see e.g. Tesfatsion and Judd (2006) for a review), the
interplay between credit supply and the real economy (see e.g. Delli Gatti (2010),
Raberto et al. (2012) and Teglio et al. (2012)) and reproducing multiple stylized
facts of the economy (see e.g. Dosi et al. (2010) and Dosi et al. (2013)). Unlike
DSGE models, agent-based models rule out the representative-agent paradigm,
shown by Kirman (1992) to be flawed in many respects. Furthermore, agent-based
models do not assume that the economy will end up in an equilibrium state sub-
ject to exogenous shocks, but allow shocks to be endogenously generated due to
interactions between economic agents or sectors, i.e., firms and banks, borrowers
and lenders, that interact in decentralized markets with limited information and
foresight.
We present here an agent-based model of the economy, henceforth Iceace
model, where different economic agents interact using simple behavioral rules
through various markets, i.e., the consumption goods market, the labor market,
the credit market and the housing market. The modeling approach followed in
developing the Iceace model is largely based on the EURACE model and simulator
(see e.g. Cincotti et al. (2012) and Raberto et al. (2012)), in particular for what
concerns the stock-flow consistency modeling approach and the careful balance-
sheet accounting both at the single agent and at the aggregate level. A simulator has
been developed from the Iceace3 model in order to be able to perform computational
experiments and test the effects of different policy settings on the workings of the
artificial economy.
1 “The state of economics. The other-worldly philosophers”. The Economist. July 16th 2009, print
edition.
2 “Economics after the crisis. New model army”. The Economist, January 19th 2013, print edition.
3 The name Iceace should be read as “Ice” and the acronym ’ACE’ and means agent-based
computational economics for Iceland, as the model is under development within a project funded
by the Icelandic Center for Research (Rannis), see http://iceace.github.io/home/
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The work presented in this paper centers around the issue of how changes in
asset prices, housing prices in our case, affects household consumption and thus
the real economy. It is well documented in the literature that changes in the wealth
of households affect their consumption (see e.g. Case et al. (2005) and Carroll et al.
(2011)). This transmission channel, between the wealth of households and their
consumption, is one reason why we have introduced a housing market into the
Iceace model. Another is because of the way the housing market can play a role in
business cycles of the real economy through mortgage defaults. As in reality, the
households of our model generally require mortgages to buy housing. If, for some
reason, the debt burden of households becomes unsustainable, banks assets will
inevitably be impaired. If the shock to the asset side of the banking system is large
enough, the credit market can freeze with catastrophic effects for the real economy
(Meh and Moran (2010)).
The housing market part of our model will not focus on the geographical aspect
of the market, like e.g. Diappi and Bolchi (2008) and Gilbert et al. (2009). Our
modeling perspective is more in line with Geanakoplos et al. (2012), looking to
the financial aspects of the market, such as housing prices, mortgage payments,
household debt, the fragility of the banking sector, and the effect of the housing
market dynamics on the real economy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present a broad
overview of our model and the timing of events. We then and describe the most
important features of the model in detail in sections 2.1-2.6. Finally we present our
results in section 3 and then give some concluding remarks in section 4.
2 The model
The economy is populated by households, firms, construction firms, banks, an eq-
uity fund, the government, and a central bank. Households provide a homogeneous
labor force to firms and constructions firms. They buy homogeneous consumption
goods (CGOODS in table 2) from firms according to their consumption budget.
They also invest in new housing units built by construction firms; moreover, they
can buy or sell housing units in the housing market.
Firms employ labor, using the labor market to hire and fire workers as needed,
and capital goods to produce the homogeneous consumption good according to
their production plan; construction firms employ labor as well, through the labor
market, and capital goods to produce new housing units. Banks supply loans to
firms and construction firms, and provide mortgages to households; banks also
collect private sector deposits (i.e., from households, firms and constructions firms)
and may borrow from the central bank if in shortage of liquidity. The government
collects taxes on both labor and capital income and it pays unemployment benefits
www.economics-ejournal.org 3
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Agent Assets Liabilities
Household housing Xh mortgages, Uh
abbrev.: Hous liquidity, Mh equity, Eh
index: h = 1, . . . ,NHous equity fund shares, V hd
Firm capital goods, K f debt (loans from banks), D f
index: f = 1, . . . ,NFirm inventories, I f equity, E f
liquidity, M f
Construction firm capital goods, Ks debt (loans from banks), Ds
abbrev.: TFirm inventories, Is equity, Es
index: s = 1, . . . ,NT Firm liquidity, Ms
Bank loans, ∑bL b = ∑ f ,s D f ,s private sector4 deposits, ∑bDb = ∑h, f ,s Mh, f ,s
index: b = 1, . . . ,NBank mortgages, ∑b Ub = ∑h Uh debt with the central bank, Db
liquidity, Mb equity, Eb
Equity Fund liquidity, Me equity, Ee
abbrev.: Fund firms’ shares, V ef
index: e construction firms’ shares, V es
banks’ shares, V eb
Government liquidity Mg debt to the central bank, Dg
abbrev.: Gov equity, Eg
index: g
Central Bank liquidity, Mc outstanding fiat money
abbrev.: CB loans to banks,L cb = ∑b D
b banks liquidity, ∑b Mb
index: c loans to the government,L cg = D
g government liquidity, Mg
fund liquidity, Me
equity, Ec
Table 1: Balance sheets of agents populating the Iceace economy.
and transfers to households. The central bank sets the policy rate, providing a
standing facility to banks and loans to the government if needed. The equity fund
owns all the equity shares of firms, constructions firms and banks. It collects their
dividends, redistributing it to households. The shares of the equity fund are equally
distributed among households, giving households an equal share in the dividend
payment of the equity fund. The equity fund may retain part of the dividends
received to provide financing to firms and construction firms, if, firstly, they are in
need of financing and, secondly, have been rationed in the credit market.
Table 1 presents the balance sheets of the agents while table 2 shows the
exchange of real assets, financial assets and their related monetary flows among
agents, occurring respectively in the consumption goods market, the labor market
and the credit market. Monetary transactions related to the exchange of real goods
are not reported in table 2. Table 3 shows the cash flow of agents. The cash flow of
each agent is grouped by whether it occurs weekly, monthly or quarterly.
The elementary time step of the model is conventionally set equal to a day;
however, most of events occur on a weekly, monthly or quarterly base, as can be
seen by the timing of cash flows in table 3, and are synchronous. In particular, at
the first day of every month, firms and construction firms make their pricing and
production plans, the labor market opens and closes, households decide wether to
enter or not the housing market. At the first day of any quarter, after the monthly
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Hous Firm TFirm Bank Fund Gov CB
Hous HOUSING CGOODS HOUSING deposits equity transfers
dividends
Firm LABOR deposits
TFirm LABOR deposits
Bank mortgage loans loans deposits
interests interests interests
principal
Fund equity equity equity deposits
dividends dividends dividends
Gov taxes deposits
seigniorage
CB loans
interests
Table 2: Interactions matrix. The matrix should be read as follows: row agents are the ones
demanding or receiving real assets (in small caps), financial claims (in bold face) with related future
monetary flows (in italics); column agents are the ones supplying the corresponding real assets,
financial claims and monetary flows.
time step, the income statements of the economic agents in the model are calculated
and balancing of agents’ accounts takes place.
In what follows, sections 2.1-2.6, we discuss in detail the agents that populate
the economy and the markets where they interact.
2.1 Production and pricing
Firms
Firms are characterized by a Leontief production technology with two inputs: labor
units L and capital goods K, i.e.,
q f = min(γL L f ,γK K f ) , (1)
where γL and γK are the productivity of labor and capital, respectively; f is the
index of the firm. Neither depreciation nor investments are considered in this
model setting, therefore capital shall be considered as a constant. Furthermore,
in the simulation presented here, we conventionally set γK = +∞ for any firms;
therefore, the amount of physical capital is not binding for production as it would
be due to the Leontief technology. It is worth noting, however, that the endowment
of physical capital is initialized to a specific amount and its value, given by the
fixed capital price PK , impacts the assets side of the balance sheet and therefore the
financial position of the firm.
Production takes place the last day of any month and is available for sale since
the first day of the following month; the production amount depends on the number
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Agent Timing Cash flow
Household weekly - consumption, CˆhB
abbrev.: Hous monthly + labor income, Zh`
index: h = 1, . . . ,NHous - taxes on labor income, Zh` t`
+/- net housing investment, ∆Xh PH
+/- net change in mortgages, ∆Uh
+ general transfer benefits, ξgW
+ unemployment benefits, ξuW
quarterly + dividends from Fund, Zhe
- taxes on capital, Zhe te
- mortgage payments, Rh
Firm weekly + sales, q f PC
index: f = 1, . . . ,NFirm monthly - labor cost, L f W f
quarterly + new loans, ∆D f
- interest payments on loans, rL D f
+ investment from Fund, E f
- dividends, div f
Construction firm monthly + sales, qs PH
abbrev.: TFirm - labor cost, Ls W s
index: s = 1, . . . ,NT Firm quarterly + new loans, ∆Ds
- interest payments on loans, rL Ds
+ investment from Fund, E s
- dividends to Fund, divs
Bank monthly +/- net change in mortgages, ∆Ub
index: b = 1, . . . ,NBank quarterly + interests on loans, ∑ f ,s D( f ,s) rL
- new loans, ∆L b
+ mortgage payments, ∑h Rh
- dividends to Fund, divb
+/- net change in loans with CB, ∆L cb
Equity Fund quarterly + dividends from Firm, TFirm, Bank, ∑div( f ,s,b)
abbrev.: Fund - dividends to Hous, ∑Zhe
index: e - investments in Firm, TFirm, ∑E ( f ,s)
Government monthly + taxes on labor income, ∑Zh` t`
abbrev.: Gov - unemployment benefits, ∑Zhu
index: g - general benefits, ∑Zhg
quarterly + taxes on capital, ∑Zhe te
Central Bank quarterly +/- net change in loans to Banks, ∆L cb
abbrev.: CB
index: c
Table 3: Timing of cash flow of agents populating the Iceace economy.
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of employees L f available to firm f and on labor productivity γL which is taken
constant over time and equal across firms.
Firms are price makers and set prices equal to the average unit production costs
plus a fixed mark-up, µ , which is fixed over time and across firms. Total production
costs related to the last month period are composed by two parts: a variable part
related to labor costs w f L f , where w f is the monthly nominal wage paid by firm
f to its employees, and a second part which does not depend on the amount of
production and is given by the cost for the service of debt, i.e., rL D f , where rL is
the nominal loan rate5 paid by firms to the banking system, and D f is the amount
of debt owed by the firm to banks. Unit production costs c f related to the last
month period are therefore given by:
c f =
w f L f + rL D f
q f
; (2)
c f is then averaged with the average production costs c¯ fI of firm’ inventories I
f
in order to compute the new average production costs c¯ f as follows:
c¯ f =
c¯ fI I
f + c f q f
I f +q f
. (3)
The new monthly price p f applied by firm f to goods for sale (both inventories
and newly produced goods) is then given by:
p f = (1+µ)c¯ f . (4)
At the beginning of the month, firms make also their production plans q˜ f
for the present month. Based on their production plans, firms will form their
labor demand. Production, as previously stated, will take place at the end of the
month and will be available for sale in the following month. Firms first form an
expectation on their expected sales both during the present and the next month.
We stipulate that sales expectations, denoted as qˆ f , are identical in the two months
and depend on previous month sales. In particular, expected sales are generally
set equal to previous month sales unless in the previous month all the inventories
were sold out. In this latter case, expected sales are set equal to an amount 10%
higher than sales in the previous month. Accordingly, the best production plan
is given by qˆ f −max(I f − qˆ f ,0), where the rationale is to produce the expected
sale foreseen next month, as production will be only available after one month,
5 The nominal loan rate, rL, is calculated as a 1% spread on the Central Bank rate, rCB, and is
invariant between firms . For more information on how the Central Bank rate is formed see section
2.6
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minus the possible remaining inventories unsold in the present month. Finally, the
production plan by firm f in the present month is indeed set to:
q˜ f = η q f +(1−η)(qˆ f −max(I f − qˆ f ,0)) . (5)
Therefore the actual plan takes into account a weighted average between previ-
ous production q f and the supposed optimal plan, η ∈ (0, 1), to avoid possible
unrealistic and too wide oscillations of output.
Given q˜ f , based on eq. 5, firms compute the labor demand L fd needed to fulfill
their plans as:
L fd =
q˜ f
γL
. (6)
The difference between L fd and the present labor endowment L
f determines
new hiring (if positive) or layoffs (if negative) for the firms.
Construction firms
In the artificial economy, construction firms, indexed by s, produce housing units,
according to a Leontief production technology, and sell them on the housing
market (see section 2.3). Two inputs are needed to produce housing, labor units L
and capital goods K, described by eq. 7. Construction firms start with an initial
endowment of physical capital, Ks(0). Their production capacity is limited by this
physical capital and they cannot invest in new physical capital. In that way we
have a constant upper limit to the growth of the housing stock in the model.
qs = min(ψL Ls,ψK Ks) , (7)
The production of each housing unit takes twelve months. Each housing unit
can only be advanced by one month at a time. The construction firm can be forced
to halt a particular housing construction project. This can happen for two reasons.
Firstly, if the construction firm is rationed in the labor market or, secondly, if the
construction firm is rationed in the credit market and is unable to get funding
from the Equity Fund6. When a particular housing unit has been worked on for
twelve months the housing unit is complete and is then counted as inventory of the
construction firm.
When deciding the amount of housing to produce, the planned production q˜s, in
the following month the construction firms look to the evolution of housing prices.
Here we define ∆PH as the change in housing price, as well as the current number of
projects under construction, αs. If the price of housing is increasing, ∆PH > 0, the
6 see section 2.4 for further details
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construction firms will randomly choose an integer amount to produce, uniformly
distributed in the interval [αs,ψK Ks], where ψK Ks is the maximum production
capacity of construction firm s. When the price of housing is decreasing, the
construction firms want to decrease their production and randomly choose an
integer amount to produce, again uniformly distributed, in the interval [1,αs].
As a consequence, that when housing price is increasing, on average, the
construction firms tries to produce more housing units, while if the housing price
is decreasing, production tends to be lower. Based on the production plan, the
construction firm will form its demand for labor, Lsd , according to equation 8 and
try to fill vacant positions in the labor market (see section 2.2), or fire workers if
the construction firm is currently employing more workers than needed to fill the
production plan.
Lsd =
q˜s
ψL
. (8)
Construction firms will post their finished housing units, inventory, for sale on
the housing market, where they compete with used housing units offered for sale
by the households themselves. Section 2.3 explains how construction firms set
prices in the housing market.
2.2 Labor market
The labor market is decentralized and is active the first day of any month after the
production planning. Production plans by firms and construction firms set their
need for employees according to eqs. 6 and 8. The difference between the need
for employees and their present labor endowment set the labor demand of any
producer and its behavior in the labor market.
The labor market is then characterized by four phases: wage adjustment, firing,
turnover and new hirings. First, producers with a positive labor demand raise their
wage offer w( f ,s) by a fixed percentage γw to keep their present workers as well
as to attract new ones, and post open job positions. Conversely, producers with a
negative labor demand fire workers that are in excess of their need. The selection
of fired workers is deterministic and households with the lowest skills are selected
for firing. In the turnover phase, a set of employee is randomly selected, with a
selection probability ς for anyone, to look for new and better paid positions at
different employers. These employees are queued in descending order according
to their skills and in turn decide to fill a new position if it is paid better than the
present one. Finally, it is the turn of unemployed households, again queued in the
market in descending order according to their skills, to look for the remaining, if
any, open positions and to fill them.
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2.3 Housing market
The housing market is decentralized and is active the first day of any month. The
housing market is mostly based on the model described in Erlingsson et al. (2013).
With respect to this previous model, the supply side of the market is enriched by
new housing units produced by constructions firms. We stipulate that households
can buy or sell only one housing unit at any market round (month). Housing
units are homogeneous. The bulk of demand and supply of housing is made by
households who are selected with a probability ρH to enter the market as buyers
or sellers with equal likelihood. This modeling choice aims to address the trading
activities driven not by speculative reasons but by different reasons, like family
needs, migration7, etc... However, we stipulated that, if households are in financial
distress, they are forced to enter the market to liquidate one housing unit, repay
mortgages and thus to reduce their debt (mortgage) burden. We call this behavior
fire sale of housing. Households are considered to be in financial distress if their
past quarterly mortgage costs (interest + principal payments) Rh are higher than a
given fraction θ of their total past quarterly net income, given by both labor income
Zh` and capital income Z
h
e . The fire sale condition is then given by:
Rh > θ
(
Zh` +Z
h
e
)
, (9)
where θ is a parameter defined in the interval (0,1). The market is a posted-price
market where sellers post prices and buyers search for the cheapest housing units.
Posted prices are based on the last market round (last month) average transaction
price PH . In particular, households selected to be random sellers and construction
firms post selling prices piH given by:
piH = PH (1+ ε
i) i ∈ {random sellers (Hous) and construction firms} (10)
where ε i is a random draw by seller i from a uniform distribution defined in the
interval between 0 and λ rndH . The rationale of Eq. 10 is that if sellers are not
subject to particular financial needs, as the households selected at random to sell
or construction firms, then they are willing to sell their housing units only if they
make a gain with respect to the reference price, PH . Conversely, in the fire sale
case, we stipulate that sellers can accept a selling price lower than the latest market
price to facilitate the liquidation of the housing unit and then the easing of their
financial distress. If the fire sale condition holds, households post selling prices phH
given by
p jH = PH (1− εˆ j) j ∈ {households in financial distress} (11)
7 It is worth noting however that no geographical features are considered in this model
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where εˆh is a random draw by household h from a uniform distribution defined in
the interval between 0 and λ firesaleH .
Buyers, i.e. households selected to buy, are randomly queued so that each
one, when getting its turn, will select the cheapest available housing unit to buy
and a transaction occurs provided that the household has the necessary financial
resources or is able to get a mortgage. The market closes when all buyers have had
their turn on the market or the supply of housing is depleted. A new housing price
PH is then calculated as the average of realized transaction prices.
2.4 Credit market
Banks provide loans to producers, both consumption goods producers and construc-
tion firms, to finance their operations, and mortgages to households to finance their
purchase of housing units. In both cases, lending activity by banks is constrained
by a minimum capital requirement which states that the equity base Eb of bank b
must be equal or higher than a fraction χ of the sum of its risky assets, i.e., the
sum of loans to firms and mortgages to households. A second constraint holds
concerning the equity of the borrower, i.e., producers must have a positive equity
to receive a loan, while households must fulfill a minimum equity ratio require-
ment, i.e. their net wealth Eh must be equal or higher than a fraction φ of their
total wealth PHXh+Mh+PFV h, given by the sum of housing wealth PHXh, liquid
wealth Mh, and equity fund shares wealth PFV h. See Table 1 for details about the
used symbols.
Loans
The market for loans to firms and construction firms opens each quarter and is active
the first day of the period. Demand for loans L ( f ,s)d by firms and constructions
firms, collectively called producers, is set by their liquidity needs to pay dividends
to the Equity Fund and interests to banks, i.e.,
L
( f ,s)
d = max
(
rLD( f ,s)+div( f ,s)−M( f ,s),0
)
(12)
Producers apply for credit first to their preferred bank randomly set at the beginning
of the simulation, then if rationed make a second application to another randomly
selected bank. For the sake of simplicity, we stipulate that loans are infinitely lived
and are never paid back.
If the producers are rationed by both their preferred bank and by a second bank,
they will be forced to cut their dividend payment. If this still is not enough to cover
the interest payment on loans, rLD( f ,s), the producers will look to the Equity Fund
for additional equity to continue their operations. In order to be accepted by the
Equity Fund the producers must have a minimum equity ratio of 5%.
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If producers are rejected by the Equity Fund, having an equity ratio of less than
5% and not being able to pay the interest on their loans, they will be considered
bankrupt and will go through what is defined as an illiquidity bankruptcy. The
illiquidity bankruptcy entails that the debt of the producer is restructured, with a
corresponding loss for the banking system, so that the payment of interest is equal
to the earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). In the case of negative EBIT the
debt of the producer will be set to zero. After receiving this debt relief the producer
will continue normal operations.
A more severe bankruptcy will occur if the producer has negative equity. In this
case the producer exits the economy. The producers debt is written off, causing
a loss for the banking system, and its employees are laid off. A new producer
is started with one employee and with new initial equity, physical capital and
inventories. The new firm will set its price to the mean price of the market while
keeping its wage level. The initial physical capital endowment of the newly
founded producer, ( f ,s), is inherited from the failed firm, ( j, i), so that K( f ,s) =
K( j,i). Inventories of the new firm are set to a level representing one workers
output over one month, I f = γL f for consumption goods producers or Is = 0 for
construction firms, and liquidity of the producer is set to the same level as in the
start of the simulation, U ( f ,s) = 0. When the asset side has been initialized the
producer is given a loan from the banking system consistent with the leverage
given to producers at the start of the simulation, D f = (PKK f +PCI f +U f )/(1+
ν f ) for consumption goods producers and Ds = (PKKs+PHIs+U s)/(1+νs) for
construction firms. The residual is then the equity of the producer, E f = PKK f +
PHI f +U f −D f for consumption goods producers and Es =PKKs+PHIs+U s−Ds
for construction firms.
Note that this mechanism for both illiquidity and insolvency bankruptcy of
producers within the artificial economy entails that the number of producers is
constant over time.
Mortgages
Mortgages are the financial instruments that households use to borrow from
banks for buying housing units. We consider a well-known type of mortgage,
the adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM)8 with a life span of 40 years. The ARM takes
into account the change of the financing conditions within the economy through the
change of the annual mortgage rate rM. The mortgage rate changes on a quarterly
base following the monetary policy decision by the central bank and is calculated
at the beginning of each quarter as the central bank interest rate, rCB, plus a fixed
8 In Iceland a special type of inflation-indexed mortgage is also widely used. This special type of
mortgage alongside the fixed rate mortgage will be considered in future enhancements of the Iceace
model.
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2% spread. No cap on the interest rate or payment variation between quarters is
considered. Given the annual mortgage rate rM, the annuity factor, Am, can be
computed for each mortgage m considering its remaining life as follows:
Am =
1
1
4rM
− 11
4rM
(
1+ 14rM
)n , (13)
where n is the number of quarters remaining in the mortgages’s life. The annuity
factor allows to easily compute the quarterly mortgage costs Rm related to mortgage
m repayment, which should include both interests, Rmr , and a fraction of the
principal, RmU . Let us denote as U
m the principal amount remaining to repay for
mortgage m, the related mortgage repayment costs (principal and interests) are
then given by the annuity factor as follows:
Rm =
Um
Am
. (14)
The quarterly interest payment Rmr is straightforward to calculate as R
m
r =U
m 1
4rM.
Finally, the part of the principal which is repaid, RmU , is simply given by the
difference between the total payment Rm and the interest payment Rmr , i.e., R
m
U =
Rm−Rmr .
Households ask for a mortgage for the purchase of new housing units if they
are not endowed with enough liquidity. Beside the equity ratio, households must
satisfy an additional requirement to get a mortgage, i.e., households need to show
to be able to pay the costs (interests and principal repayment) of all their mortgages,
including the new one, given their present income and the present mortgage rate.
In particular, for any household asking for a new mortgage m∗, the total quarterly
costs of present mortgages ∑m Rm plus the additional quarterly costs related to the
new requested mortgage, i.e., Rm
∗
, must not be higher than a fraction β of the total
quarterly net income, including both labor Z` and capital income Ze. The condition
that needs to be fulfilled by a household to get a mortgage is then:
∑
m
Rm+Rm
∗ ≤ β (Z`+Ze). (15)
Like for producers, any household has its preferred bank to whom asking for a
mortgage. Unlike producers, it does not turn to a different bank if rationed by its
preferred one.
When a household sells a unit of housing it uses the amount received to pay
back the entire mortgage. If the amount received is more than the mortgage owed
the difference will be kept as liquidity.
If it happens that a household is spending a very large part of its disposable
income on mortgage payments, such that Rh > θhigh
(
Zh` +Z
h
e
)
, the household will
get a debt write-off, since reasonably it is unable to service the debt. The write-off
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will lower the debt service to a sustainable level, Rh = θlow
(
Zh` +Z
h
e
)
, and the
total mortgage of the household will be: Uh = Rh /rM. This will, of course, be
reflected by the asset side of banks’ balance sheets, creating a loss equal to the
total debt write-off.
2.5 Households’ consumption and the wealth effect
At the beginning of each month, households set their consumption budget, i.e.,
the amount of money to spend on the consumption market during the month. The
consumption budget ChB of any household h depends on the labor Z
h
` and capital
Zhe income realized in the last quarter
9 and on its quarterly mortgage expenses
Rh = ∑m Rm,h. Any households then determines its monthly disposable income ϒh
as:
ϒh =
1
3
(Zh` +Z
h
e −Rh) . (16)
which is the amount that could be reasonably spent for consumption. Consumption
decisions then is mainly modeled according the theory of buffer-stock saving
behavior (Carroll, 2001; Deaton, 1992), which states that households consumption
depends on a precautionary saving motive, determined by a target level of liquid
wealth Mh to income ratio. Let’s denote ρC as the target ratio between the stock
of liquid wealth, Mh, and the monthly disposable income, ϒh; according to the
buffer-stock theory of saving, the monthly consumption budget would be then
given by ϒh +αC(Mh− ρCϒh). According to this rule, consumption is set at
a value lower (higher) than the disposable income if the actual ratio Mh/ϒh is
lower (higher) than the target ρC. The rationale is then to adjust the consumption
budget every month so to adaptively meet the pre-determined liquid wealth to
disposable income target ratio by consuming less (more) than the disposable
income if Mh < ρcϒh (Mh > ρcϒh), so to increase (decrease) Mh. The parameter
αC sets the speed of adjustment. Furthermore, we take also into account the wealth
effect on consumption given directly by the quarterly variation of households’
equity or net wealth Eh, which is mainly given by the rising or falling housing
prices. Indeed, according to Carroll et al. (2011) the wealth effect of an increase in
housing prices is much higher than the wealth effect observed from rising stock
prices. According to Calomiris et al. (2012), the wealth effect ranges from 5% to
8%. Mixing together the buffer-stock theory of saving and the wealth effect, the
monthly consumption budget CB is then given by:
ChB = ϒ
h+αC(Mh−ρCϒh)+ωEh , (17)
9 It is worth remembering here that the labor income changes on a monthly basis, while capital
income and mortgage payments are computed and accounted quarterly. The labor income in then
the sum of three months, or one quarter, worth of labor income.
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where the parameter ω sets the size of the wealth effect on consumption. It is worth
noting that the wealth effect is a shock transmission mechanism from the housing
market to the real economy, since an increase (decrease) in housing wealth, due to
an increase (decrease) in the price of housing, will result in increased (decreased)
households’ net wealth and then consumption. This will result in more (less)
production by firms and therefore in an increase (decrease) of the employment
level.
The consumption market opens at the beginning day of every week and all
households are randomly queued and willing to spend a fraction10 of their part
of the monthly consumption budget not yet spent in the previous weeks. The
household selects a firm to buy consumption goods from at random, though giving
more weight to the probability of selecting firms that offer the lower prices. In
particular, the probability is inversely proportional to prices, e.g. a firm offering
double the minimum price has half the probability of being selected by a household
as a firm offering the minimum price.
The consumption goods market closes either when there are no goods for sale
or when all households have spent their entire weekly consumption budget.
2.6 Policy makers: Central Bank and the Government
The Central Bank has two main functions in the model. Firstly, the Central Bank is
responsible for the monetary policy and sets the interest rate, rCB, on a monthly
basis according to a Taylor rule. The Taylor rule takes into account both the
unemployment rate, U , and the rate of inflation, I , and sets the interest rate
according to eq. 18.
rCB =I +
1
2
(I −ICB)− 12U , (18)
where ICB is the inflation target of the Central Bank. The minimum interest rate is
set to 0.5%. Secondly, the Central Bank acts as a liquidity provider for the banking
sector. If the banks of the artificial economy require liquidity they can draw upon
the Central Bank credit line at any time and without limit.
The government, being responsible for the fiscal policy in the economy, has
two main functions. Firstly, it collects taxes on revenues, both labor tax, t`, and
capital income tax, te. The second function is to distribute this income among
households, both as general transfer benefits, ξgW , distributed equally among all
households and unemployment benefits, ξuW , given to unemployed households.
The government will always aim at having zero deficit, thus raising (lowering)
taxes and lowering (raising) benefits if the balance is negative (positive). The
10 The value of the fraction depends on the number of weeks remaining in the month, i.e. it can
range from 1/4 for the first week of the month to 1 for the last week
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Figure 1: Simulation paths for GDP and unemployment rate. Four values of β are considered, i.e.,
β = 0.2 (black line), β = 0.25 (blue line), β = 0.3 (green line) and β = 0.4 (red line).
parameter, Γ defined in the interval (0, 1), decides the ratio between using taxes and
benefits to balance the budget of the government. A higher Γ means that taxes are
used more than benefits to balance the budget when there is a deficit, but benefits
are raised more when there is a surplus. In a way a higher Γ can be interpreted as
a more social type of government, where both taxes and benefits are higher than
when Γ is low. Taxes, both on labor and capital income, cannot be raised above
50% and the maximum transfer benefits are 40% of average wages. The minimum
tax is 10% while benefits can go to 0% of average wages. The unemployment
benefits are fixed at 50% of the average wage.
3 Results
A set of computational experiments, based on numerical simulations of the agent-
based model, has been carried out and is presented in this section. The main
objective of computational experiments is to study the effect on the economy of
banks’ different standpoints, represented in the model by parameter β , towards the
creditworthiness of the borrowers defining households financial robustness (see
section 2.4 for details). Parameter β sets banks’ attitude when evaluating the eligi-
bility of an household for a mortgage loan (see eq. 15). A higher β means looser
creditworthiness conditions required by the bank to grant a mortgage. The setting
for the simulations is the following: 8000 households, 125 firms, 25 construction
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Figure 2: Simulation paths for mortgages. Four values of β are considered, i.e., β = 0.2 (black
line), β = 0.25 (blue line), β = 0.3 (green line) and β = 0.4 (red line).
firms, 2 banks, 1 government and 1 central bank. For each configuration of the
parameters, several random seeds that generate different stochastic processes have
been used in order to improve the reliability of the outcomes.
For the sake of a clear presentation of results, this section is divided into three
parts. In the first part, there is a short discussion regarding the initialization of the
model and how some parameters are derived from empirical data. In the second
part, a single simulation (that can be considered as a specific realization of the
agent-based economic model) is presented, and a qualitative analysis of economic
interactions is performed. Finally, the third part, where the results of all simulations,
corresponding to fifty different seeds, are statistically aggregated and analyzed as
a whole. In this way, we can first describe in detail the economic mechanisms of
interaction and propagation emerging from a representative simulation, and then
show that these mechanisms hold for every simulation, irrespective of the random
seed used.
3.1 Initialization of the simulation settings
We initialize the balance sheet of economic agents both by looking into empirical
evidence from the Icelandic economy11 and by setting the initial values of the
11 Empirical data retrieved from Statistics Iceland (statice.is)
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variables from a limited set of assumptions. In this way we aim to restrict the
degrees of freedom of the model.
We set the number of firms in the model, NFirm+NT Firm, to 150. According to
Statistics Iceland data about one in every six firms in Iceland are is the construction
industry. Therefore the number of construction firms in our model is: NT Firm = 25,
which leaves us with NFirm = 125 consumption goods producers. Also, the labor
force share of construction firms (δ s) according to Statistics Iceland is about 7.5%
of the total labor force. From the data we also find the maximum yearly growth of
the housing stock, ρs = 0.015.
We also limit the degrees of freedom by deriving the initial state of many
variables from just a few assumptions. We start with setting the gross money wage,
W (0) = 5, for producers and the initial unemployment level, U (0) = 10%, which
gives us the initial number of employees for each producer, L f ,s. The total number
of employees working in the construction firms is set according to δ s, so that
∑s Ls = δ s (1−U )NHous. Consequently, ∑ f L f = (1− δ s)(1−U )NHous. Now
we can set the initial debt of producers so that the service of the debt is 20% of
the labor cost: D f ,s = 0.2
(
W (0)L f ,s
rL
)
, where rL is the initial loan rate, given by
rCB+1%, where the initial central bank policy rate is set to 2%. Then the Equity
of firms is set using the initial leverage of firms and construction firms, E f ,s = D
f ,s
ν f ,s .
Given the liabilities side of the balance sheet of producers, we set their liquidity,
M f ,s, to 0 and their inventories to a month’s worth of production, given a single
employee, I f = γL L f for consumption goods producers, and Is = 0 for construction
firms. Physical capital is then used to balance the assets and liabilities of producers.
Using a similar approach we construct the initial balance sheet of households by
assuming that each household starts with 5 housing units, Xh(0) = 5, each worth,
PH(0) = 20W (0), and a liquidity equal to three months’ wages, Mh(0) = 3W (0).
Consequently we can decide the initial mortgages of households, Uh, and equity,
Eh, using the starting leverage, νh. After initializing the balance sheet of producers
and households we can start constructing the balance sheet of banks. Firstly we
assume that deposits of banks are given by the sum of producers’ and households’
liquidity: D = ∑h, f ,s Mh, f ,s. Banks assets are composed by producers’ debt,L b,
households mortgages, Ub, and finally the banks own liquidity, Mb, which is
initially set to a ratio of total assets. Then equity can be set using the initial capital
adequacy ratio, χ(0). Banks’ debt to the central bank is set to balance assets and
liabilities of the bank.
Some parameters, like the mortgage duration TM, and the capital adequacy ratio
of banks χ , are derived from common knowledge while other parameter values,
like the size of the wealth effect of housing, ω , come from the literature (see e.g.
Carroll et al. (2011) and Case et al. (2005)). Finally some parameter values are
based on best-guess estimates and conventions when working with agent-based
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Figure 3: Simulation paths for housing market variables. Four values of β are considered, i.e.,
β = 0.2 (black line), β = 0.25 (blue line), β = 0.3 (green line) and β = 0.4 (red line).
models. Tables 7 and 8 in the appendices summarize the values given to relevant
parameters and initial values of the main endogenous variables of the model.
3.2 Analysis of economic interactions
Figures 1 to 6 show the time series from a single simulation run. The main features
of this particular simulation are shared by the whole set of simulations composing
our computational experiment, as shown in section 3.3.
The monthly GDP, calculated as the sum of real production of consumption
goods producers and construction firms, levels associated with different β s are
plotted in figure 1. The black line corresponds to the most restrictive attitude
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Figure 4: Simulation paths for equity capital and earnings. Four values of β are considered, i.e.,
β = 0.2 (black line), β = 0.25 (blue line), β = 0.3 (green line) and β = 0.4 (red line).
towards borrowers (β = 0.20), meaning that a high income to housing expenditure
ratio is requested to get a loan, whereas the red line corresponds to the most
permissive case (β = 0.40), that we could homologate to subprime lending. The
blue (β = 0.25), and green (β = 0.30) lines represent two intermediate cases.
In figure 2 the direct impact of such different lending strategies on the total
mortgages amount is clearly visible. When financial requirements are low, a higher
amount of mortgages is granted and the housing market is more active, with a much
higher level of transactions, at least in the first 6 years of simulation. Going back
to figure 1, we can appreciate the economic implications of the different borrowing
requirements. If only the first 6 years were considered, the result would be very
clear: the more you lend, the more you grow. In other words, more permissive
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Figure 5: Simulation paths for GDP and unemployment rate. Four values of β are considered, i.e.,
β = 0.2 (black line), β = 0.25 (blue line), β = 0.3 (green line) and β = 0.4 (red line).
household’s financial requirements entail higher GDP growth rates. However, the
second part of the simulation tells another story. The red GDP trajectory shows
two deep recessions, the first starting at year 6, the second starting after year 8. The
green line also shows a deep recession after year 9. What is visible to the naked
eye, looking at these plots, and confirmed by the statistical aggregation of all the
simulations in table 4, is that the volatility of GDP increases when a higher amount
of credit money is allowed to enter the economic system. At a first glance, the blue
line, corresponding to the intermediate value of (β = 0.25), seems to be the best
compromise between the slow growth of the black line (β = 0.20) and the instable
behavior of the two other cases with higher β ’s.
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It can be relevant to analyze how the economic system runs into a crisis when
the value of β is high enough, examining the crucial events that involve different
economic agents, and observing the main economic interactions.
From the households (borrowers) perspective, as it has been shown, a more
permissive policy leads to an increase in mortgages, and, consequently, in the
aggregate liquid wealth of the household, i.e. ∑h Mh, (see figure 5). The new
available mortgage loans obviously push the housing price up (figure 3), rais-
ing the nominal wealth of households. In turn, the greater liquidity, combined
with the wealth effect, entails an increasing goods’ demand that leads to higher
consumption, and thus production. On the other hand, a more permissive loans
policy increases households’ housing expenditures, due to the raise of the mortgage
interest payments with respect to their income, as reported in figure 5. We can
notice that in both the red and the green cases, the housing expenditure starts to
raise quite early (around year 4). At year 6, the year of the first crisis for β = 0.40,
the average housing expenditure is slightly less than 30%, which is a very high
value compared to the cases of lower β ’s. Furthermore, this 30% percentage is
an average value, meaning that, in some cases, the interest payment associated to
households debt load is simply not bearable. As a consequence, some households
are forced to sell their house in order to get sufficient liquidity to pay back the
mortgage. These fire sales, also shown in figure 5, start immediately after the peak
of the housing expenditure versus income ratio, causing a decrease in the housing
price (figure 7). We argue that these price dynamics can be described as a bubble
determined by an excess of credit money.
When the housing price has decreased enough, around the second quarter of
year 6, the housing markets starts up again and the number of transactions rises
sharply, as figure 2 shows. It is worth noting that this “market efficient” reactivation
of the housing transactions is a main distinguishing factor between the first crisis
of year 6 and the second crisis starting in the second quarter of year 8, as we will
explain later.
Before going on and describing the second crisis, it is useful to analyze what
happens from firms and banks side. Figure 4 shows several time series related to
firms. It is important to underline that the first crisis does not trigger any firms’
bankruptcy in the model. It is basically a demand crisis due to the excessive
burden of interest payments for the households, with a consequent reduction of
consumption. The fall of the housing prices exacerbates this reduction through
the wealth effect. In turn, firms have to reduce production with obvious effects on
firms aggregate revenues and equity.
After almost one year of crisis, as we have seen, households’ demand starts
to raise again and the economy slowly recovers. At year 8, the GDP red line
(β = 0.40) reaches again a comparable level with respect to the other β values.
However, figure 4 shows that firm’s equity still remains at a significantly lower
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Figure 6: Simulation paths for firms bankruptcies. Four values of β are considered, i.e., β = 0.2
(black line), β = 0.25 (blue line), β = 0.3 (green line) and β = 0.4 (red line).
level, meaning that the first crisis left firms in a more fragile financial condition,
undermining the solidity of the whole economics system. In fact leading after half
a year to a serious bankruptcy chain that triggers a second crisis, which can be
described as a sort of double dip recession (figure 1). During this second crisis,
the bankruptcy of many firms results in a further reduction in banks’ equity that,
in turn, are unable to meet the Basel II adequacy ratio, setting a minimum equity
capital requirement with respect to the weighted total assets owned by the bank.
As a consequence, banks are no more able to lend money, as far as they have not
cured their balance sheets, and the housing market freezes, as shown in figure 2.
It could be interesting to resume here the mechanism of interaction between
housing market and firms’ activity emerging from the model in the case of a
permissive financial requirements policy for households’ mortgages (β = 0.40).
In a first crisis, triggered by the housing price bubble and by the consequent
incapability for households of paying back their mortgages, firms’ profit and equity
capital is seriously reduced. Later, after a 2 year slow recovery of the economy, a
second crisis is triggered again by an excessive amount of households’ debt burden.
This time many firms are financially fragile, due to the previous crisis, and go into
bankruptcy, triggering loan write-offs that reduce banks’ equity capital, preventing
banks from granting new mortgages due to the Basel II regulation, completely
freezing the housing market.
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Figure 7: Simulation paths for prices. Four values of β are considered, i.e., β = 0.2 (black line),
β = 0.25 (blue line), β = 0.3 (green line) and β = 0.4 (red line).
On the other hand, looking at the time series of the various economic variables
represented in figures 1 to 6, for lower values of β , it clearly emerges a much more
stable context. There are, of course, fluctuations in the GDP, but they do not seem
to be rising in amplitude and there is no trace of the violent crisis that characterize
higher β cases. As a last comment, it is worth noting that the economic performance
with the lowest β = 0.2 value is significantly lower than the performance with
β = 0.25.
The conclusion of this qualitative analysis is therefore quite evident. High val-
ues of β (corresponding to a loose regulation) cause a higher economic instability
with a higher chance for deep and violent recessions. On the other hand, too strict
regulations (as for β = 0.2) can be an obstacle to growth and limit the economic
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period (years) β = 0.2 β = 0.25 β = 0.3 β = 0.4
1-15 33,127 35,033 35,530 33,460
(1712) (2358) (2307) (1694)
Real 1-6 31,596 31,228 32,578 33,693
GDP (409) (624) (862) (956)
7-15 34,147 37,570 37,498 33,304
(1330) (1644) (1464) (979)
1-15 0.07 1.36 1.32 0.92
(0.77) (0.58) (0.57) (0.67)
Yearly real 1-6 -3.30 0.08 2.32 2.88
GDP growth (%) (1.21) (0.98) (0.95) (0.92)
7-15 1.77 1.73 0.52 0.60
(0.14) (0.15) (0.22) (0.36)
1-15 29,936 45,110 45,030 51,945
(393) (777) (856) (3639)
GDP 1-6 33,688 23,213 30,202 35,017
volatility (189) (453) (415) (604)
7-15 20,549 24,347 34,448 58,408
(602) (763) (1793) (5059)
1-15 20.5 16.5 15.7 21.2
(0.8) (1.2) (1.0) (0.7)
Unemployment 1-6 24.4 25.2 22.2 20.0
(%) (0.79) (0.75) (0.95) (1.01)
7-15 17.9 10.7 11.3 22.0
(0.52) (0.50) (0.18) (0.47)
1-15 43,315 43,372 43,370 43,089
(292) (289) (283) (237)
Housing 1-6 41,173 41,250 41,291 41,295
stock (114) (115) (115) (115)
7-15 44,744 44,787 44,756 44,285
(177) (172) (167) (115)
Table 4: Real values of the Iceace economy for three different periods of the simulations and four
different values of β . Standard error shown in parenthesis.
activity. There seems to exist a trade-off between growth and stability, and policy
makers should be careful in setting a balanced regulation according to their goals
and to the economic conditions.
3.3 Analysis of aggregated outcomes
The average values (and standard errors) of several economic variables have been
computed considering 50 different random simulation seeds, and are collected
in tables 4 to 6. The idea is to show that the economic reasoning presented in
section 3.2 is not just related to a specific simulation outcome but characterizes
the whole set of runs in the computational experiment. In order to better explain
how different regulation rules affect the macro economy in the short and in the
long run, the economic variables are presented for three different time spans. The
first one represents the whole period considered. The second one includes the first
6 years, that we could consider as a short-medium run, while the last time span
considers the long run, from year 7 to year 15. In general, the specific analysis
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period (years) β = 0.2 β = 0.25 β = 0.3 β = 0.4
1-15 0.0079 0.0082 0.0084 0.0086
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Price 1-6 0.0063 0.0064 0.0064 0.0065
level (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
7-15 0.0090 0.0095 0.0098 0.0100
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002)
1-15 7.12 7.40 7.60 7.73
(0.20) (0.24) (0.27) (0.27)
Wage 1-6 5.67 5.70 5.75 5.79
level (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.80)
7-15 8.10 8.54 8.83 9.01
(0.15) (0.17) (0.19) (0.19)
1-15 153.7 195.5 220.6 222.2
(5.4) (8.8) (10.2) (8.6)
Housing 1-6 116.7 132.0 145.0 156.2
price (1.5) (2.7) (3.9) (5.0)
7-15 178.4 237.8 271.0 266.2
(4.0) (5.8) (6.0) (2.9)
1-15 0.65 1.91 2.37 1.62
(0.05) (0.24) (0.23) (0.11)
Central bank 1-6 0.50 0.50 0.59 1.03
interest rate (%) (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.11)
7-15 0.75 2.86 3.56 2.01
(0.06) (0.22) (0.12) (0.06)
1-15 0.0 0.0 0.2 8.7
(0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (1.5)
No. Firm 1-6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Bankruptcies (0.0) (0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
7-15 0.0 0.0 0.3 14.4
(0.0) (0.0) (0.1) (1.4)
Table 5: Nominal values of the Iceace economy for three different periods of the simulations and
four different values of β . Standard error shown in parenthesis.
presented in section 3.2 is confirmed by the data presented in tables 4 to 6. The
main macroeconomic effect of decreasing the limitation on households mortgage
borrowing (increasing β ), raises dramatically the volatility of real GDP growth,
as already commented in the previous section and corroborated by table 4. We
used the standard deviation of the GDP growth as a straightforward measure of the
economic volatility.
Looking at table 4, one can appreciate the short and long term effects of the
computational experiment. In the case of a very permissive requirements policy,
i.e., β = 0.40, the mean real GDP level and the mean yearly GDP growth are the
highest in the first six years, and the lowest in the last nine years, with respect to
all β values. The opposite obviously happens to the unemployment rate, which is
the lowest in the first six years and the highest in the last nine. This facts show that,
apart from a huge rise in volatility, also the overall performance of the economic
system is seriously compromised in the long run. The narrative of section 3.2 is
again confirmed by looking at table 5. In the case of subprime lending (β = 0.40)
the rate of banks’ mortgage rejections in the first period is very low, allowing
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period (years) β = 0.2 β = 0.25 β = 0.3 β = 0.4
1-15 1,794,667 1,977,154 2,147,666 2,272,147
(11676) (16899) (27978) (26677)
Household 1-6 1,873,190 1,883,715 1,955,635 2,063,031
total debt (10468) (7682) (4953) (12781)
7-15 1,742,318 2,039,447 2,275,686 2,411,557
(4128) (15580) (21590) (10065)
1-15 0.43 0.37 0.34 0.35
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Household 1-6 0.66 0.56 0.52 0.51
leverage (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
7-15 0.29 0.24 0.23 0.25
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
1-15 1.016 1.026 1.044 1.075
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Household 1-6 0.998 1.029 1.065 1.093
exp/income (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.011)
7-15 1.028 1.022 1.029 1.062
(0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.010)
1-15 247,814 259,345 271,813 258,296
(336) (890) (2026) (2700)
Firm total 1-6 245,537 254,046 259,054 262,019
debt (206) (459) (590) (703)
7-15 249,333 262,877 280,319 255,814
(209) (746) (1723) (3413)
1-15 2.44 2.73 3.25 3.17
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
Firm 1-6 2.63 2.99 3.18 3.25
leverage (0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06)
7-15 2.32 2.56 3.29 3.11
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.12)
Table 6: Financial values of the Iceace economy for three different periods of the simulations and
four different values of β . Standard error shown in parenthesis. Leverage is defined as debt/equity.
households’ total debt to grow much faster. Households ratio between expenditure
and income is higher, due to a higher interest bill generated by mortgage loans,
making their financial condition more fragile. However, the main indicator of
financial fragility, the debt-equity ratio, is lower for high β s; at a first glance this
could seem inconsistent with our narrative, but it actually reveals a subtler aspect.
The growth of households’ debt (increasing β ) is in fact compensated by a growth
of households’ assets value, resulting from higher asset prices, since the housing
stock is barely variable among different β ’s. Therefore, what enlarges equity in
households balance sheet is the boost of the housing price. The point that is not
fully captured in the tables, which only presents ensemble averages over a given
time period, is that the apparent financial stability of households, due to the equity
increased by the housing price bubble, collapses when the house price index falls,
deflating households balance sheet. Looking at figures 4 and 3, one can observe this
phenomenon, particularly highlighted by fire sales which entail that households,
despite their apparent financial robustness, are forced to sell their houses in order
to avoid bankruptcy. A little lesson we can learn from this, is that we should focus
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on various stability indicators, looking both at stocks (e.g. leverage) and flows (e.g.
expenditure income ratio) in order to have a more complete picture.
The ratio between total expenditure and total income, reported in table 6 is
an interesting indicator. It is below 1 in the first six years only in the case of
β = 0.20, and it is rapidly increasing with β . This is more evidence that, for high
β s, households are on average financing the excess spending with new credit.
Looking at firms’ data, the scenario emerged in section 3.2 is again confirmed.
Raising β fosters an accumulation of firms’ debt and an erosion of firms’ equity
in the first six years, jeopardizing firms’ financial stability, as also pointed out
by the value of firms’ leverage, i.e., debt-equity ratio, that is much higher in the
case of high β s. The consequences of all this are visible in the average number of
bankruptcies affecting the economic system, dramatically raising for β = 0.40.
4 Concluding remarks
The paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of an easy access to mort-
gage loans. The adopted methodology belongs to the agent-based modeling ap-
proach. We built a model of a credit network economy, including a consumption
market and a housing market, following a rigorous balance sheets approach in order
to ensure the stock-flow consistency of the model. We designed a computational
experiment varying the conditions that needs to be fulfilled by a household to get
a mortgage. For each set of parameters 50 simulation runs with different random
seeds have been performed in order to improve the statistical relevance of the
experiment.
Results tell us that an easy access to mortgage loans causes a higher economic
instability with a higher chance for deep and violent recessions. On the other
hand, too strict regulations can be an obstacle to growth and limit the economic
activity. The main propagation mechanism emerged from the study passes trough
the growth of a price bubble in the housing market and trough the consequent loans
write-off, affecting banks’ equity capital, when the bubble bursts. The richness
of the model permits to follow the economic dynamics with a high level of detail,
following the evolution of every economic agent in the system.
We claim that this approach is able to present an useful picture of our complex
economic system, pointing out dynamics and interactions that are not usually taken
into account in aggregated models. The message for policy makers emerging from
our study is the existence of a trade-off between growth and stability. Therefore,
a strong and balanced regulation of the credit market, according the economic
conditions, is required to prevent economic crises.
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Appendix 1
Parameter Description Value
Time constants
TD Loan duration +∞
TM Mortgage duration in years 40
TH Housing construction time in months 12
Housing market
φ Minimum equity ratio of mortgage borrowers −∞
λ rndH Seller price interval for housing 0.025
λ f iresaleH Fire sale price reduction interval 0.05
Households
ω Households wealth effect 0.07
ς Households labor turnover probability 0.1
νh Households starting leverage 1
ζmin Minimum amount of housing units 1
θ Household budget threshold for fire sale 0.6
θhigh Household budget threshold for mortgage write-off 0.7
θlow Household budget ratio for mortgage write-off 0.5
αC Speed of adjustment of household savings 0.1
ρC Household target ratio of liquid wealth over disposable income 1
Firms and construction firms
ν f Firms starting leverage 4
µ Firms markup on consumption goods 1.1
γL Firms labor productivity 1000
γK Physical capital utilization of firms +∞
νs Construction firms starting leverage 1
ψL Construction firms labor productivity 0.8
ψK Physical capital utilization of construction firms 0.7
δ s Labor force share of construction firms 0.075
ρs Maximum yearly growth rate of housing stock 0.015
Banks
χmin Minimum capital adequacy ratio of banks 0.085
Government and Central bank
Γ Tax and benefit ratio policy parameter 0.9
ICB Central bank inflation target 0.02
Table 7: Table of general parameters in the Iceace economy.
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Appendix 2
Variable Description Value
Price and interest rates
PH(0) Initial price of a housing unit 20W (0)
PC(0) Initial price of consumption goods 0.0056
PK(0) Initial price of capital goods 100∗PC
rCB(0) Initial Central Bank interest rate 0.02
rL(0) Initial bank loans interest rate rCB+0.01
rM(0) Initial bank Mortgage interest rate rCB+0.02
Firms and Construction firms
W f ,s(0) Initial wage of firms and construction firms 5
Households
Xh(0) Households initial amount of housing units 5
Mh(0) Households initial liquidity 3W (0)
Banks
χ(0) Initial capital adequacy ratio of banks 0.1
Mb(0)/(Mb(0) +Ub(0) +L b(0)) Initial liquidity ratio of banks 0.091
Government and Central bank
t`(0) Initial income tax 0.2
te(0) Initial capital income tax 0.2
ξU (0) Initial unemployment benefit ratio 0.5
ξT (0) Initial general transfer benefit ratio 0.3
U (0) Initial unemployment level 0.1
Table 8: Table of initial values for some of the variables of the artificial economy.
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